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MAINE’S OPEN LANDS: PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE 
LAND, THE RIGHT TO ROAM, AND THE RIGHT TO 
EXCLUDE 
Peter H. Kenlan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On a late summer afternoon, a boy pilots a small boat toward a deserted beach 
while another crouches in the bow with an anchor poised and ready.  As the boat 
gently scrapes to a halt, the anchor lands in the wet sand with a dull thud and the two 
boys splash ashore.  Equipped only with peanut butter sandwiches, they set off along 
the beach looking for tide pools.  Behind them, they leave only a few ephemeral 
footprints—readily erased by the waves. 
On a bright and clear February morning, a man rides his snowmobile along a 
well-traveled trail.  The scenery flashes past as he dives into the woods and then 
reemerges into the sunlight—crossing streams, fences, and stone walls.  By 
lunchtime, the man has crossed land belonging to three dozen different people—
none of whom he has ever met. 
On an early fall day, a man and his son hike through the woods to get to a remote 
lake surrounded by a large tract of privately-owned forest.  Around their necks, they 
carry binoculars for birdwatching.  On the opposite side of the lake, a woman and 
her daughter also approach the lake with a small inflatable kayak and a fishing pole. 
On Memorial Day weekend, an accountant packs her car in Boston for a trip to 
Maine.  She closes the lid on a trunk filled with slightly musty clothing and then lifts 
her kayak up on top of the car.  That afternoon, she parks at a public ramp and paddles 
a few miles out to a small privately-owned island where she sets up a tent for the 
night. 
The people in each of these vignettes have certain things in common.  They are 
all in Maine, they are all using private land, and they are all strangers to the owners 
of that land. Despite their commonalities, the law treats these people quite 
differently. 
In many parts of the world, these activities would all be considered normal, 
wholesome, and, above all, lawful.  In Maine, however, some of these people are 
enjoying their use by right while others are doing so at the landowner’s whim.  Still 
others may be trespassers.  Yet even the participants themselves may not know for 
sure which is which. 
Maine’s Constitution declares that “possessing and protecting” property is a 
“natural, inherent[,] and unalienable right.”1  That statement is as enigmatic as it is 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2016; M.S. (Forestry), 2006, 
University of Maine; B.A. (Biology), 2003, Brandeis University. 
 1.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 1.  Here at the outset, a general comparison between the Maine and federal 
constitutions is both interesting and informative.  Maine’s constitution begins with positive declarations 
of “natural and unalienable rights” similar to those described in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.  
See ME. CONST. art. I–IV; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  By comparison, 
the federal constitution declares similar rights in negative terms, prohibiting the federal government from 
acting in certain areas.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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illuminating.  A nearly absolute “right to exclude” others is a core element of private 
property in Maine, but there is nevertheless a long-standing acceptance of the public 
use of private land—Maine’s “open lands tradition”—reflected in history, tradition, 
modern practice, and law.2   
Part II of this Comment examines the right to exclude others from private 
property.  Not all countries accept that such a right exists.  Instead, many countries 
recognize the polar opposite—a public “right to roam” on private land.  This section 
compares the right to roam in selected foreign jurisdictions with the development of 
the right to exclude in the United States. 
In Part III, this Comment explores the right to exclude in Maine law and tradition 
while Part IV uses the extent of the public’s right to use intertidal land as a case study 
in the conflict between the Legislature’s stated desire for public access to the 
outdoors and the court’s protection of an individual’s right to exclude.3 
Finally, in Part V this Comment considers the broad implications of Maine’s 
law and policy regarding public use of private land.  The development of an 
unchecked right to exclude as a core element of Maine property law is an unbalanced 
oversimplification of the meaning of private property that has enriched property 
owners at the public’s expense.  Ultimately, an absolute right to exclude in Maine is 
contrary to theory, history, and policy.  Recalibrating the hierarchy of public and 
private rights in land would restore balance to property law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In the background of this Comment are fundamental questions about the source 
and extent of property “ownership” whose temptingly straightforward answers belie 
morality, history, and policy.  First among these is a consideration of why private 
property exists at all.  Property theorists have long discussed and debated whether 
there is a rational source for private property that stands as a self-evident truth, but 
do not agree about the identity of the source, or whether such a source exists in the 
first place.4  Thus, it seems necessary to accept that any society must have, even 
within its bedrock principles, what amount to articles of faith—non-rational tenets 
nonetheless inextricably intertwined with law, society, and culture.5  
Among the philosophical justifications for private property, two popular 
conceptualizations are emblematic of the extremes.  One rests on a natural rights 
theory of private property as a sacrosanct individual entitlement, whereas the other 
rests on the notion that private ownership is an instrumentality—a means to achieve 
                                                                                                     
 2.  E.g., James M. Acheson, Public Access to Privately Owned Land in Maine, 15 ME. POL’Y REV. 
18 (2006) (“The widespread use of private land by the public goes by various names.  Some refer to 
Maine’s ‘open land[s] tradition.’ . . .  But more than informal tradition is involved.  Maine law facilitates 
the public use of private land.”). 
 3.  “Intertidal” refers to the region of the seashore that is between the high-tide mark and the low-
tide mark.  Donald R. Richards & Knud E. Hermansen, Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water 
Bodies, 47 ME. L. REV. 35, 49 (1995). 
 4.  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 
533–41 (2005). 
 5.  The Author recognizes the irony that accepting this premise is itself an article of faith. 
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a set of social ends.6  Even when we accept the latter as the source of individual 
rights, the former maintains some persuasive sway, and so the law in this area is a 
balance of conflicting ideologies.7 
Perhaps the most familiar articulation of a natural rights theory of property is 
that of John Locke.  Locke’s creation myth assumes as a premise that in the 
beginning, the entire world was common property and the only thing to which a man 
could lay a moral claim was his own labor.8  By improving land, a man acquired 
ownership of the land he improved.9  Stripped to essentials, government’s sine qua 
non under Locke’s conception is to protect private property, which he defined to 
include “life, liberty, and estate.”10 
The competing theoretical extreme is that private property is no more than an 
instrumental creation of societies and governments.11  In this conception, private 
ownership is not an article of faith, but a constellation of rules, subject to adjustment, 
to optimize the achievement of social ends.12  This schema further reveals that to the 
extent that property is emblematic of personal liberty, such liberty is not infinite in 
quantity, nor created from thin air, but rather part of a zero-sum equation.13  To the 
extent that a property owner’s increased ability to do what he wishes with his 
property increases his liberty, it equally reduces the liberty of every other party to do 
the same.14 
A. The Right to Roam 
Outside the United States, some jurisdictions achieve balance between public 
and private rights in land by sharply curtailing a landowner’s right to exclude and 
instead carving out its inverse—a public right to roam the countryside.  For example, 
Sweden and England both recognize different degrees of a right to roam, but both 
                                                                                                     
 6.  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 546–50; see generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory 
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
 7.  These competing conceptions of property are not limited to expression within the fields of 
philosophy and legal scholarship.  The United States is home to a vociferous and popular “Property Rights 
Movement” that might generally align with the natural rights theory.  See Joseph L. Sax, Why America 
has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 513 (2005).  On the other hand, there are 
groups just as popular and just as vocal that support land use regulations—for example in the area of 
environmental protection—that align more with an instrumental view of private property.  See id. 
 8.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 111 
(Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003). 
 9.  Id. at 111–12. 
 10.  Id. at 136–37. 
 11.  Take for example the simple core element of a capitalist economy—private ownership of the 
means of production.  Capitalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  Hypothetically, an 
environmental regulation imposed on the owners of widget factories creates an incentive to comply with 
the regulations as efficiently as possible.  In this simplistic example, private ownership of the factory 
results in efficient compliance with regulation—and the potential for innovative solutions to minimize 
costs and maximize results. 
 12.  ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP 
OF LAND 10 (2007) (“Property arises not when Alice takes control of a piece of land but later, when Bob, 
Carol, and Dave . . . come along and get together with Alice to decide exactly what rights Alice shall have 
and how far Alice’s property rights will limit the liberties of Bob, Carol, Dave, and all others.”). 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  Id. 
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countries also protect landowners’ important interests. 
1. Swedish Allemansrätt 
Many European countries recognize a right to roam that allows anyone to walk, 
hike, or camp on private land if he does no damage and does not disturb the owner.15  
The Swedish call this right allemansrätt—everyman’s right—and include it in their 
constitution.16  In fact, Sweden’s official tourism website specifically promotes the 
right of widespread public access.17 
Moreover, Sweden’s constitution acknowledges this right of public access in a 
provision equivalent to the United States Constitution’s “Takings Clause,” which 
protects private land from public appropriation or restriction and mandates 
compensation when such appropriation or restriction is required.18  At the same time, 
this provision guarantees “access for all to the natural environment in accordance 
with the right of public access.”19  Accordingly, the right of access is subject to 
relatively few limitations, among them a prohibition on damaging the natural 
environment, causing the owner significant damage or inconvenience, or intruding 
on the tomt20—roughly meaning the “homestead”—which is a zone of privacy.21 
2. British Countryside and Rights of Way Act 
In contrast to the stability of the Swedes’ right to roam, Britons once enjoyed a 
robust right to roam but lost it over a period of centuries as the upper-classes 
converted the commons to private property.22  Envious of their other European 
neighbors, public sentiment favoring broad roaming rights began to grow in the late 
20th century.23  Finally, in 2000, the British Parliament enacted the “Countryside and 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See Regeringsformen [Constitution] 2:15 (Swed.).  An English translation of the Swedish 
Constitution is available from the Riksdagen website.  The Instrument of Government, RIKSDAGEN 81, 
85, http://www.riksdagen.se/Global/dokument/dokument/laws/the-instrument-of-government-2012.pdf.  
Similar rights exist to varying degrees in Norway, Finland, Denmark, and, outside of Scandinavia, 
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Spain.  Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private Land for 
Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting the Right to Exclude, 23 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2011); Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining 
the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 404 (2007). 
 16.  Regeringsformen [Constitution] 2:15 (Swed.). 
 17.  See VISIT SWEDEN, http://www.visitsweden.com/sweden/Things-to-do/Nature--Outdoors/ 
Nature-loving-Sweden/Roam-free-in-Sweden/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (“The Right of Public Access 
(‘Allemansrätt’) gives you the right to roam the countryside in Sweden in perfect peace and quiet without 
someone saying: ‘get off my land,’ unless you stomp all over someone’s back garden or trample all over 
a farmer’s cultivated field that is . . . .  When you are in Sweden you have the right to walk, cycle, ride, 
ski and camp on any land with the exception of private gardens, near a dwelling house or land under 
cultivation.”). 
 18.  Robertson, supra note 15, at 216–21. 
 19.  Id. at 216 n.22. 
 20.  For a whimsical illustration of the tomt (homestead), see generally ASTRID LINDGREN, THE 
TOMTEN (PaperStar ed. 1997). 
 21.  Robertson, supra note 15 at 217–19 (citing Kevin T. Colby, Public Access to Private Land--
Allemansrätt in Sweden, 15 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 253, 259 (1988)). 
 22.  Anderson, supra note 15, at 378–79. 
 23.  Id. at 404. 
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Rights of Way Act,” which opened up certain private property to public access.24  
Among the provisions of the Act, the public may freely enter private lands classified 
as “open country,” including mountain, moorland, heath, and downland.25  However, 
the British right of access is more limited than its Swedish counterpart.  The right 
extends primarily to walking and picnicking, but not to hunting, kindling fires, 
cycling, horseback riding, or removing plants.26 
Thus, the Countryside and Rights of Way Act carefully balances the competing 
interests of landowners against public interests, including transportation, enjoyment 
of nature, public health, culture and history, and community cohesion.27  In return 
for the statutory right of access to the countryside, landowners ultimately received 
assistance with the cost of providing that access, along with limited liability for 
injuries sustained by those exercising their new rights.28 
B. The Right to Exclude 
The examples from Sweden and England demonstrate that a qualified right to 
roam does not necessarily harm private property interests.  Even in the early United 
States, land that was both unimproved and unenclosed was open to the public for 
hunting, grazing livestock, walking, and gathering food or firewood.29 
In a South Carolina example, the state supreme court refused to find a hunter 
liable for trespass when the hunter openly defied the landowner’s order to keep off.30  
There, the court relied not on the landowner’s limited right to exclude, but on the 
hunter’s positive right to hunt on unenclosed land.31  In Vermont, the state’s 
constitution specifically protects that right.32 
Similarly, in both Georgia and Alabama, unenclosed lands were common 
pasture, and the public could use the countryside so long as it respected fenced areas 
and did not interfere with landowners.33  At least with respect to uncultivated or 
unimproved land, the acceptance of a right to roam in the United States predates and 
opposes the notion of an absolute right to exclude others from private land.34 
However, in the 1979 case of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court identified the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential 
                                                                                                     
 24.  Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 1, (Eng.). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Anderson, supra note 15, at 407. 
 27.  Id. at 412–17. 
 28.  Id. at 406. 
 29.  FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 33. 
 30.  Id. at 38 (citing M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (S.C. 1818)). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  VT. CONST. ch. II, § 67 (“The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to 
hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not inclosed, and in like manner to fish in all 
boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the 
General Assembly.”). 
 33.  FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 29–30.  
 34.  See Robert M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 951–52 
(2013) (reporting that roughly half of the states retain a presumption of landowner consent to enter 
unenclosed, unposted land). 
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sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”35  For so 
forceful a pronouncement, the Court relied on only three sources in a footnote: a case 
involving the occupancy required to establish “Indian Title” in the Court of Federal 
Claims,36 Fifth Circuit dicta,37 and Justice Brandeis’ dissent in an intellectual 
property case.38  Despite the proposition’s weak support, the Court’s subsequent 
opinions in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.39 and Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission40 firmly embraced the fundamental nature of a 
landowner’s absolute right to exclude. 
In Loretto, a New York property owner challenged a cable television provider 
that had installed equipment under the authority of a New York law requiring 
landlords to permit the installation of cable equipment.41  The Court relied in part on 
Kaiser and the right to exclude in holding that “a permanent physical occupation 
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it 
may serve.”42  A few years later in Nollan, the Court held that a legislatively-created 
public access easement constitutes a permanent physical occupation and is likewise 
a taking.43 
Prior to the Kaiser-Loretto-Nollan line of cases, the right to exclude was far 
more limited.44  These relatively recent developments established a nearly absolute 
right to exclude as fundamental to private property rights in the United States. 
                                                                                                     
 35.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).  A common—if tortured—metaphor 
for understanding property rights is that those rights consist of a bundle of “sticks” that correspond to 
different “pieces” of property ownership.  For example, a man may own title to a home while he surrenders 
the right of occupancy to a lessor, a bank owns a mortgage lien, a neighbor owns an access easement, and 
the municipality and a public utility each own a right-of-way for services.  However, at least one 
Commentator argues that the Court’s pronouncement that a property owner’s right to exclude was within 
the “category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation” was weakly supported 
by precedent.  Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665, 667–
68 (2011). 
 36.  Anderson, supra note 15, at 427 (citing United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 
(Ct. Cl. 1975)). 
 37.  Id. (citing United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
 38.  Id. (citing Int’l News Serv.  v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
As one Commentator put it, “[n]one of these sources really support the notion that the right to exclude 
must be absolute.”  Id. 
 39.  458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 40.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 41.  Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421–22. 
 42.  Id. at 426, 433. 
 43.  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831–32. 
 44.  See FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 29–39.  Other theoretical limitations continue to exist, for 
example in the case of necessity.  See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).  But see David L. Callies & 
J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional 
Right, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2000) (arguing that the right to exclude others is a fundamental 
aspect of property rights that have “always been fundamental to and part of the preservation of liberty and 
personal freedom in the United States.”).  However, in arriving at this conclusion, the article relies 
substantially on the cases discussed supra in notes 35, 39–40.  Id. at 41–42. There are only two cases—
the earliest being a New Hampshire case from 1872—discussing a right to exclude prior to the 20th 
century.  Id. at 46–47 (citing Eaton v. B.C.&M.R.R., 1872 WL 4329 (1872)). 
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C. Summary 
Courts have come to describe a landowner’s absolute right to exclude as a 
foregone conclusion—as though private ownership fails to make sense without it.  
Notwithstanding the popularity of that view, examples abound both abroad and in 
the United States’ history of an expansive right of the public to use private land under 
certain circumstances.  It is in this historical and political context that this Comment 
goes on to examine the public use of private land in Maine. 
III. MAINE’S OPEN LANDS 
A. Tradition 
Whose woods these are I think I know. 
His house is in the village though; 
He will not see me stopping here 
To watch his woods fill up with snow. 
—Robert Frost45 
Maine is home to a long tradition of public use of private land and of landowner 
acquiescence to such use.  It is readily apparent that this arrangement is a virtual 
necessity because the vast majority of land in the state is privately owned.46  To 
illustrate, only fifteen landowners held the nearly half of Maine’s land area contained 
within its north woods.47  Nonetheless, the owners posted only 8% of that land 
against trespassing.48  This distinguishes Maine from the western United States—
especially Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and Arizona in which the public owns 
more than half of the land area.49  Despite the private ownership of most of Maine, 
there is extensive public use of that land in different contexts.50 
The best example of the open lands tradition and its reflection in Maine culture 
is the use of private land for hunting.  In the early United States, it was the regular 
                                                                                                     
 45.  ROBERT FROST, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, in NEW HAMPSHIRE: A POEM WITH 
NOTES AND GRACE NOTES 87, 87 (1923). 
 46.  Approximately 94% of all land in Maine is privately owned.  Public Land Ownership by State, 
NATURAL RES. COUNCIL OF ME., http://www.nrcm.org/documents/publiclandownership.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015). 
 47.  David Vail & Lars Hultkrantz, Property Rights and Sustainable Nature Tourism: Adaptation and 
Mal-adaptation in Dalarna (Sweden) and Maine (USA), 35 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 223, 230–31 (2000). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  The reason for the disparity between East and West in this regard is simply that in the East, States 
joined the union as preexisting entities whereas most western land entered federal ownership through 
conquest, compromise, or purchase before the establishment of States in those territories.  ROSS GORTE, 
CAROL VINCENT, LAURA HANSON & MARC ROSENBLUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL 
LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1–7 (2012).  In these states, land is commonly owned by federal 
agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service.  Id. at 
8–13.  Interestingly, in western states, public use of public land is low.  See Charles S. Lucero, Public 
Access to Federal Lands: Dilemma, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 194, 195 (1982) (citing lack of awareness, 
physical remoteness, leaseholder interference, and obstructive private landowners as factors preventing 
public access to federal land in the western United States). 
 50.  But see James M. Acheson & Julianna Acheson, Maine Land: Private Property and Hunting 
Commons, 4 INT’L J. COMMONS 552, 564 (2010) (arguing that describing Maine as “over 90% . . . ‘private 
property’ oversimplifies a very complicated ownership” regime). 
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practice of the public to hunt on private land.51  Not only was the practice common, 
in some places it was a usage undertaken by right.52  With 94% of Maine’s land in 
private hands, modern hunting could not exist without extensive public use of private 
land.53  What is more, a sizable segment of the hunting community believes that 
private landowners lack the right to restrict hunting—especially when there is a 
history of that use going back many years.54  When philanthropist Roxanne Quimby 
accumulated large tracts of forest in Maine’s north woods and then posted the land 
against hunting and motorized access, the Bangor Daily News published an article in 
which hunting camp owners called her “Public Enemy No. 1.”55  Those who became 
accustomed to using the land had inaccurately come to believe that they had a right 
to continue that use. 
In other instances, private groups have taken the initiative to develop 
relationships with landowners to secure access to conduct certain activities on private 
land.  For example, the Maine Snowmobile Association oversees a network of 14,000 
miles of trails, 95% of which are on private property.56  The Association serves as an 
umbrella under which local clubs organize to groom and maintain trails, and 
negotiate with landowners on an individual level.57  The cumulative effect of these 
local connections has created an extensive trail network that is open to the public. 
Another example is the Maine Island Trail Association, which oversees a water 
                                                                                                     
 51.  See Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L. J. 549, 554–
56 (2004) (describing the United States’ departure from English common law in allowing the public to 
hunt on private land). 
 52.  See, e.g., M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (S.C. 1818). 
 53.  See Acheson, supra note 2, at 21 (“The tradition of using other people’s property for recreation 
has enormous economic implications for the state . . . .  In 2004, it was estimated that hunting was worth 
$325 million to the Maine economy . . . .  These activities depend, in large measure, on tourists and 
sportsmen having access to other people’s land.”) 
 54.  Lloyd C. Irland,  Land, Timber, and Recreation in Maine’s Northwoods:  Essays by Lloyd C. 
Irland, ME. AGRIC. & FOREST EXPERIMENT STATION MP730, 73 (“The public has never clearly perceived 
the Maine Woods as private property.  The phrase ‘our forests’ is repeatedly heard in the rhetoric of 
hunters, canoeists, and snowmobilers as well as citizens concerned about broader values.”); see Acheson 
supra note 50, at 556 (“People hunt on land owned by others, run their snowmobiles and all-terrain 
vehicles (ATVs) on it, and use the land for bird watching and cross country skiing.  In northern Maine, 
people take hiking and canoeing trips in which they camp for days on end on land owned by others.  
Members of the public generally feel they have a ‘right’ to use the land of others for recreation—
particularly in the vast forested regions of northern Maine.  Sometimes they ask permission to use the 
land, but often they do not.  When land is posted, many feel that something that should be theirs has been 
taken away.  It is not uncommon for members of the public to tear down the ‘No Trespassing’ signs and 
use the land anyway.  The landowners, for their part, generally acquiesce.  Even if they are not entirely 
happy with the arrangement, they generally allow others to use their land without much complaint.”). 
 55.  Nick Sambides, Jr., ‘She Has Hurt so Many People’; For Wilderness Camp Leaseholders 
Roxanne Quimby is Public Enemy No. 1, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 22, 2008 at A1; Acheson, supra 
note 2, at 20 (“Roxanne Quimby had posted her land and no one in authority seriously challenged her 
right to do so, but in the process, she had violated a number of informal rules and expectations of rural 
Mainers.”). 
 56.  Our Landowners, ME. SNOWMOBILE ASS’N, http://www.mesnow.com/MaineLandowners.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015).  Snowmobiling contributes up to $350 million to Maine’s economy each 
winter.  Julia Bayly, Snowmobile Enthusiasts Fuel $350 Million Economic Boom Statewide, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (JAN. 29, 2010, 9:29 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2010/01/29/business/snowmobile-
enthusiasts-fuel-350-million-economic-boom-statewide/. 
 57.  ME. SNOWMOBILE ASS’N, http://www.mesnow.com/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
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trail spanning Maine’s coast with islands and other coastal sites available for public 
use.58  Originally encompassing state-owned islands exclusively, its purpose is 
similar to the Maine Snowmobile Association—to exchange good stewardship for 
assurance of access.59  Over time, private owners came to value that exchange in 
their own right.60  As of the summer of 2014, the Maine Island Trail included some 
207 islands and coastal sites open to public camping or picnicking, of which two-
thirds are private property.61 
B. Law 
Customary uses and private agreements allowing public use still do not confer 
any public right to use private property.  Those who enjoy this permissive access 
fear that landowners might withdraw their permission at any time.62  Demographic 
changes in the state and “horror stories” of in-migrants buying Maine land and 
posting it, unaware or unmindful of the culture of permissive access, heighten this 
fear.63 
Maine’s Legislature has clearly acknowledged the importance of permissive 
access and has enacted legislation to maintain and promote public access to the 
outdoors.64  The legislative findings that preface Maine’s Natural Resource 
Protection Act recognize the recreational value of natural resources as contributing 
                                                                                                     
 58.  About Us, ME. ISLAND TRAIL ASS’N, http://www.mita.org/about (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).  
Economic activity related to the Maine Island Trail amounts to approximately $1.75 million per year.  Tux 
Turkel, The Revenue Trail: Maine’s Nationally Recognized Recreational Water Route Generated $1.75 
Million a Year in Spending over the Past Nine Boating Seasons, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 17, 2011 
at A1. 
 59.  See David R. Getchell, Sr., The Island Trail, 57 SMALL BOAT J. 88, 88 (1987). 
 60.  See generally ME. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION, BUREAU OF PARKS & LANDS, THE RECREATION 
MGMT. PLAN FOR THE PUBLIC ISLANDS ON THE ME. ISLAND TRAIL 2004–2014 (2003). 
 61.  Partners Answer the Call, THE ISLAND TRAIL 13 (Summer 2014), http://issuu.com/meislandtrail/ 
docs/mita_spring14_final_pagesreordered (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). 
 62.  Restricting access is commonly referred to as “posting” land—usually by literally posting “no 
trespassing” signs as prescribed by statute.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(C) makes it a crime to enter land (1) 
posted in accordance with 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(4), which requires signs not more than 100 feet apart, (2) 
posted in a manner that is “reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders,” or (3) fenced or 
otherwise enclosed to exclude intruders. 
 63.  According to a survey conducted by the Small Woodland Owners Association of Maine, 14.9 
percent of survey respondents posted their land “no trespassing” in 1991.  In 2005, the results of a similar 
survey indicated that 39.4 percent of owners posted them.  Acheson, supra note 2.   Still, that fear is likely 
overstated.  See Kristen Andresen, Whose Woods?, UMAINE TODAY, Fall 2010 at 27, 29 (“One of the 
biggest misconceptions that has emerged . . . is that out-of-state landowners are more likely to post their 
land.  In fact, just the opposite is true.  People from away don’t always come up here in the fall, so they 
don’t see the hunters on their land . . . [t]here’s this idea that we’ve got new landowners coming in and 
buying off the land and shutting down access, but that’s not the case.  It’s the Mainers.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 64.  To the extent that the public must rely on landowner acquiescence to provide the vast majority 
of land for hunting, snowmobiling, kayaking, hiking, and other outdoor pursuits, the State has a powerful 
incentive to create policies that encourage landowners to allow public use.  In 2013, hunting accounted 
for over $231 million of the $7.7 billion spent on tourism in Maine.  ME. OFFICE OF TOURISM, HUNTING 
IN MAINE IN 2013: A STATEWIDE AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTIONS ii (2014), https://www1.maine.gov/ifw/pdfs/ME_Hunt_Economics Final Report 10-06-
2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015); VISITMAINE.COM, 2013 MAINE TOURISM HIGHLIGHTS, 
http://visitmaine.com/assets/downloads/2013_MaineFactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
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to the general welfare of Maine’s citizens.65  Likewise, the statute creating the Land 
for Maine’s Future program states at the outset that public access to Maine’s natural 
environment is essential to the State’s quality of life.66  Further, in the statutes 
relating to planning and land use regulation, Maine recognizes recreational access to 
critical natural resources as one of the State’s goals in enacting those statutes.67  
Finally, the Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife is required to develop and 
implement a landowner relations program to “[e]ncourage landowners to allow 
outdoor recreationists access to their property.”68 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has also given legal 
effect to Maine’s tradition and culture of permissive use.  As the Law Court 
explained, “Maine has a tradition of acquiescence in access to nonposted fields and 
woodlands by abutters and by the public.  Pursuant to our open lands tradition, 
recreational use of unposted open fields or woodlands and any ways through them 
are presumed permissive[.]”69 
1. Trespass 
Still, a Maine outdoorsman faces a confusing array of statutes, customs, and 
presumptions if he attempts to determine his rights with certainty.  As a starting 
point, Maine’s criminal trespass statute makes it a crime when a person, “knowing 
                                                                                                     
 65.  38 M.R.S.A. § 480-A (Pamph. 2014) (“[T]he State’s rivers and streams, great ponds, fragile 
mountain areas, freshwater wetlands, significant wildlife habitat, coastal wetlands and coastal sand dunes 
systems are resources of state significance.  These resources have great scenic beauty and unique 
characteristics, unsurpassed recreational, cultural, historical and environmental value of present and 
future benefit to the citizens of the State and that uses are causing the rapid degradation and, in some 
cases, the destruction of these critical resources, producing significant adverse economic and 
environmental impacts and threatening the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of the State.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 66.  5 M.R.S.A. § 6200 (2013 & Supp. 2014) (“Maine is blessed with an abundance of natural 
resources unique to the northeastern United States; that these natural resources provide Maine residents 
and visitors to the State with an unparalleled diversity of outdoor recreation opportunities during all 
seasons of the year and a quality of life unmatched in this nation; that the continued availability of public 
access to these recreation opportunities and the protection of the scenic and natural environment are 
essential for preserving the State’s high quality of life . . . that rising land values are putting the State’s 
real estate in shoreland and resort areas out of reach to most Maine citizens . . . and that public interest in 
the future quality and availability for all Maine people of lands for recreation and conservation is best 
served by significant additions of lands to the public domain.”) (emphasis added). 
 67.  30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(3)(F), (J) (2011 & Supp. 2014) (“The Legislature declares that, in order 
to promote and protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the State, it is in the best interests 
of the State to . . . protect the State’s other critical natural resources, including without limitation, wetlands, 
wildlife and fisheries habitat, sand dunes, shorelands, scenic vistas and unique natural areas; [and] . . . 
promote and protect the availability of outdoor recreation opportunities for all Maine citizens, including 
access to surface waters.”). 
 68.  12 M.R.S.A. § 10108(4-A)(A) (2005 & Supp. 2014).  The statute goes as far as to prescribe that, 
to the extent resources allow, the program shall include education programs for landowners regarding 
liability, landowner rights, and the tradition of allowing use of private land for recreation, and programs 
for land users including a code of ethics for using private land.  Id. § 10108(4-A)(C).  Still, this program 
is always a work in progress.  George Smith, Maine Must Expand Landowner Relations Programs—and 
it’s Up to You to Git-er-done!, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://georgesoutdoornews.bangordailynews.com/2015/01/05/maine-woods/maine-must-expand-
landowner-relations-programs-and-its-up-to-you-to-git-er-done/. 
 69.  Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 8, 955 A.2d 234 (citations omitted). 
196 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
[he] is not licensed or privileged to do so,” (1) enters a dwelling, (2) enters any locked 
or barred structure, (3) enters any enclosed or posted place, or (4) defies a lawful 
order to leave or not to enter.70  In the face of landowner silence, then, a mere stroll 
through private woods does not expose a man to criminal liability.  Obtaining a 
similar result, Maine’s civil trespass provisions typically include damages as an 
element.71  On the other hand, the Law Court has recently confirmed that common 
law trespass remains a viable cause of action in Maine.72  Nevertheless, a Maine 
court ruling on a common law trespass action would likely consider custom and 
history as evidence of consent in the case of landowner silence, defeating the claim.73 
2. Access Protection 
The popular understanding of the tradition of public use of private land is that it 
is enshrined as a rule of “permissive trespass.”74  However, beyond mere permissive 
trespass, Maine law also specifically protects certain kinds of access to private land. 
The Great Ponds Access Act is a statutory provision that authorizes a particular 
public use of private land.75  The act secures the public right to access great ponds,76 
stating, “[n]o person on foot shall be denied access or egress over unimproved land 
to a great pond.”77  Great ponds are held by the State in trust for the public.78  Even 
without this statute, the public has a common law right “to fish and fowl and to cut 
ice upon [great ponds] . . . provided it can reach the pond by ‘passing to it on foot 
                                                                                                     
 70.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1) (2006 & Supp. 2014). 
 71.  See, e.g., 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 7551-B, 7552 (2003 & Supp. 2014) (providing liability in a civil action 
when a person intentionally enters another’s land without permission and causes damage). 
 72.  Medeika v. Watts, 2008 ME 163, ¶ 5, 957 A.2d 980 (“A person is liable for common law trespass 
‘irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he 
intentionally enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so.’” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(A) (1965))).  Even in the absence of damage, a court would go 
on to address the issue of nominal damages.  See id.; Gaffny v. Reid, 628 A.2d 155, 158 (Me. 1993) 
(“Some damage is presumed to flow from a legal injury to a real property right.”). 
 73.  See Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 8, 955 A.2d 234; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1965) 
(“Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur.  It may be manifested by action or inaction and need 
not be communicated to the actor.”); id. at cmt. d. (“[I]f it is the custom in wooded or rural areas to permit 
the public to go hunting on private land or to fish in private lakes or streams, anyone who goes hunting or 
fishing may reasonably assume, in the absence of a posted notice or other manifestation to the contrary, 
that there is the customary consent to his entry upon private land to hunt or fish.”).  
 74.  See Deirdre Fleming, New bill to protect rights of owners worries land users, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.pressherald.com/2011/03/20/new-bill-to-protect-rights-of-owners-
worries-land-users-_2011-03-20/ (referencing a century-old history of “permissive trespass” and 
describing proposed legislation that would enact a “reverse posting” law in Maine requiring recreational 
users including hunters to obtain express permission before traversing private land for outdoor pursuits); 
Trevor Maxwell, Can you get to the beach?, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jul. 31, 2011), 
http://www.pressherald.com /2011/07/31/can-you-get-to-the-beach__2011-07-31/) (invoking Maine’s 
history of “permissive trespass” or “permissive access”). 
 75.  17 M.R.S.A. § 3860 (2006). 
 76.  “Great ponds” are defined by Maine statute as “any inland bodies of water which in a natural 
state have a surface area in excess of 10 acres and any inland bodies of water artificially formed or 
increased which have a surface area in excess of 30 acres.”  38 M.R.S.A. § 480-B(5) (2001 & Supp. 2014). 
 77.  17 M.R.S.A. § 3860. 
 78.  Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950). 
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without trespassing upon any man's corn or meadow.’”79  The Great Ponds Access 
Act codifies this common law right.80 
Maine’s common law also authorizes the public to enter private intertidal land 
for the purpose of “fishing, fowling, [or] navigation.”81  In the early 1980’s, the 
Maine Legislature attempted to codify this common law right as well, but the Law 
Court held that the resulting statute was unconstitutional because it simultaneously 
purported to expand the scope of the right.82   
3. Landowner Incentives 
As an alternative to creating statutory rights to access private land, other 
provisions of Maine law encourage landowners to permit public access voluntarily.  
For example, Maine’s landowner liability law protects landowners against tort 
claims from members of the public injured while on private land.83  The landowner 
liability law states that “[a]n owner . . . of premises does not have a duty of care to 
keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational . . . activities or to 
give warning of any hazardous condition . . . to persons entering for those 
purposes.”84  Because the statute eliminates any duty owed by a landowner to anyone 
using the landowner’s property for recreation, it thereby defeats ordinary negligence 
claims.85  The law goes even further by requiring anyone who fails in an action for 
landowner liability to pay the landowner’s costs, including attorney’s fees.86  Since 
the enactment of the landowner liability law, there has not been even one successful 
suit for damages based on landowner liability to recreational users of private land.87  
The protection landowners receive through this statute is likely responsible for the 
success of arrangements like the snowmobile trail network that depend on extensive 
                                                                                                     
 79.  Id. (citing Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227, 229–30, 77 A. 938, 939 (1910)).  These common law 
rights derive in part from the Colonial Ordinance of 1641–47.  See Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 16 
(Dec. 10, 1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 148, 150 (Richard L. Perry ed. 1978). 
 80.  See Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227, 230, 77 A. 938, 939 (1910) (“[F]or great Ponds lying in 
common though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowl there, and 
may pass and repass on foot through any man’s propriety for that end, so they trespass not upon any man’s 
corn or meadow.”).  The court explained that the Colonial Ordinance became part of Maine common law 
“not in the sense that the court extended it to this state, but that the court found it extended by the public 
itself, as the expression of a public right, so acted upon and acquiesced in as to have become a settled, 
universal right.”  Id.  The statute further authorizes a fine and jail time for anyone impeding access to a 
great pond across private land.  17 M.R.S.A. § 3860 (“Whoever violates this section shall be punished by 
a fine of not more than $100 and by imprisonment for not more than 90 days.”). 
 81.  For a more expansive discussion, see infra Part IV. 
 82.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 83.  14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A (2003 & Supp. 2014). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 6 cmt. b (2010). 
 86.  14 M.R.S.A. § 159-A (“The court shall award any direct legal costs, including reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, to an owner, lessee, manager, holder of an easement or occupant who is found not to be 
liable for injury to a person or property pursuant to this section.”). 
 87.  Landowner Liability Explained: Rights and Responsibilities, ME. DEP’T OF INLAND FISHERIES & 
WILDLIFE, 
http://www.maine.gov/ifw/aboutus/commissioners_office/OutdoorPartnersPgrm/landowner_liability_ex
plained.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
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use of private land.88 
Another example concerns the establishment of a public easement by 
prescription.  In that context, the Law Court will apply a presumption that any public 
use is with the landowner’s permission and is not adverse to the landowner’s 
interests.89  This has the effect of defeating the adversity element of prescriptive 
easement claims when the public undertakes recreational use of private land.90 
Here, both the Legislature and the Law Court apply incentives to encourage a 
policy of promoting public access to the outdoors by opening private land to the 
public.  Specifically, Maine’s law negates a landowner’s otherwise well-founded 
fears of adverse possession claims and suits for personal injury. 
4. Eminent Domain 
Finally, Maine takings law demonstrates that courts have been especially jealous 
guards of individual property rights.  Both the Federal and Maine Constitutions limit 
the exercise of eminent domain by requiring that the government pay “just 
compensation” whenever it takes private property for public use.91  Even early Maine 
cases insisted that takings be justified by true public use, while later cases held that 
takings could occur even when the private owner retains his title. 
a.  Public Use 
In one early Maine case, Proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree, the 
Law Court declared that legislation making it easier to establish an adverse 
possession claim was unconstitutional.92  The court took the position that doing so 
transferred some quantum of property from the owner to the adverse possessor 
thereby taking property from one party and giving it to another.93  This the court 
refused to allow.94  Accordingly, the early Maine court also categorically refused to 
allow the exercise of eminent domain to seize land for the use of a railroad, holding 
that between private parties no man could be compelled “to part with an inch of his 
                                                                                                     
 88.  See supra Part III.A. 
 89.  Lyons v. Baptist Sch. Of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, ¶ 24, 804 A.2d 364. 
 90.  Id. ¶ 25; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 (2000). 
 91.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”); Me. Const. art. I, § 21.  Eminent domain is the inherent power of the sovereign to take 
private property and convert it to public use.  Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
2009). 
 92.  2 Me. 275 (1823).  This decision also established the Law Court’s power of judicial review—to 
strike down unconstitutional acts of the Maine Legislature in the same way that Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137 (1803), did for the United States Supreme Court.  HUGH G. E. MACMAHON, PROGRESS, 
STABILITY, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 38 (Drummond, Woodsum & MacMahon 2009). 
 93.  Laboree, 2 Me. 275, 290–91 (1823).  The statute would have enabled a person claiming title by 
adverse possession to claim a parcel of land greater than that which he actually occupied during the 
statutory period.  Further, the statute purported to have retroactive effect.  P.L. 1821, ch. 62, § 6. 
 94.  Id. (“[T]he private property of one man cannot be taken for the private uses of another in any 
case.  It cannot by a mere act of the legislature be taken from one man, and vested in another directly[.]”).  
The Law Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it would “impair and destroy vested 
rights, and deprive the owners of real estate of their titles thereto, by changing the principles and the nature 
of those facts, by means of which those titles had existed and been preserved to them in safety.”  Id. at 
295. 
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estate.”95 
However, by the early 20th century, the Law Court was willing to allow the 
exercise of eminent domain to take private property and convey it to another private 
entity if the public nonetheless held a right to use the condemned property.  In the 
case of Ulmer v. Lime Rock Railroad Co., the court approved of taking private land 
to construct a railroad branch line.96  The court reasoned, “[T]ransportation lines 
from place to place . . . are as much a public enterprise and use as are public roads.”97  
Not to be dissuaded by the contention that only the railroad would put the track to 
use, the court held that “[t]he character of the use, whether public or private, is 
determined by the extent of the right by the public to its use, and not by the extent to 
which that right is . . . exercised.”98 
Still, the Law Court was unwilling to extend such a right in a situation where 
the public would merely benefit from a private use.  In the case of Brown v. Gerald, 
an electric company sought an easement by eminent domain to cross a private farm 
with its poles and wires to reach a private manufacturing facility.99  While the court 
recognized that the manufacturing facility would be of great “public benefit,” it was 
unwilling to equate that with “public use.”100  In the court’s view, taking private 
property to facilitate private business—no matter the degree of public utility—was 
“not legislation, but robbery.”101  Since the 1905 decision in Brown through the 
present, the Law Court has remained protective of this narrow interpretation of 
“public use.”102  Given this long and consistent history, the public use requirement 
                                                                                                     
 95.  Bangor & Piscataquis R.R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290, 294 (1872) (“This exercise of the right 
of eminent domain is, in its nature, in derogation of the great and fundamental principle of all 
constitutional governments, which secures to every individual the right to acquire, possess, and defend 
property.  As between individuals, no necessity, however great, no exigency, however imminent, no 
improvement, however valuable, no refusal, however unneighborly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable, 
no offers of compensation, however extravagant, can compel or require any man to part with an inch of 
his estate.  The constitution protects him and his possessions, when held on, even to the extent of churlish 
obstinacy.”).  
 96.  98 Me. 579, 57 A. 1001 (1904). 
 97.  Id. at 586, 57 A. at 1003. 
 98.  Id.  However, it is worth considering whether this seeming relaxation of the “public use” 
requirement reflects a change in the court’s view of private property, or the degree to which the court 
would go to facilitate the business of the railroad.  The court’s cases of the late 1800’s and early 1900’s 
made it effectively impossible for a railroad to ever be held liable for damages resulting from a collision 
at a railroad crossing.  See MACMAHON, supra note 92, at 79–102 (surveying tort cases involving 
collisions at railroad crossings through 1920 and reasoning that the doctrine of contributory negligence 
barred a plaintiff’s recovery whether he saw the train coming, in which case he was negligent for failing 
to avoid it, or did not see the train coming, in which case he was negligent for failing to see it). 
 99.  100 Me. 351, 356, 61 A. 785, 787 (1905). 
 100.  Id. at 370, 61 A. at 793 (“Something more than mere public benefit must flow from the 
contemplated use.  Public benefit or interest are not synonymous with public use.  . . . If the doctrine of 
public utility were adopted in its fullest extent, there would practically be no limit upon the exercise of 
this power.”). 
 101.  Id. at 371, 61 A. at 794.  The court further discussed the difference between supplying electricity 
to a private business and supplying electricity for public lighting.  In its view, the latter would constitute 
a public use justifying the exercise of eminent domain.  Id. at 376, 61 A. at 796. 
 102.  See, e.g., Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 125, 136 A. 664, 666 (1927) (holding that a statute 
purporting to allow lumber operators to cross private land without being liable for trespass was 
unconstitutional and holding that “[t]he public benefit doctrine does not obtain in this state.”); Hayley v. 
Davenport, 132 Me. 148, 149–50, 168 A. 102, 103 (1933) (holding that a statute purporting to allow a 
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under Maine law is narrower—and thus more protective of individual property 
rights—than federal law.103 
b.  Takings 
Another limitation on a state’s power of eminent domain is the term “taking” 
itself.  The requirement that a state pay compensation whenever its actions amount 
to a taking limits the state’s exercise of the police power.104  Yet, it is not always 
clear when a taking has occurred.  Easy cases are those where legal title is wrested 
from one party and vested in another.  Hard cases concern when a legislative action 
short of taking title restricts what the landowner may do with his land—so-called 
“regulatory takings.”105 
In State v. Johnson, a 1970 opinion involving a wetlands statute that prevented 
a property owner from filling in coastal land, the Law Court reasoned, “[D]eprivation 
of property contrary to constitutional guaranty occurs if it deprives an owner of one 
of its essential attributes, destroys its value . . . or imposes conditions upon the right 
                                                                                                     
person to establish drains or ditches across other private property to make the person’s own land accessible 
or useful was unconstitutional and holding that “an appropriation of property for a purpose which is a 
great benefit to the public is not for that reason a taking for a public use.”); Blanchard v. Dep’t of Transp., 
2002 ME 96, ¶ 29, 798 A.2d 1119. 
 103.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  The plaintiffs in Kelo challenged the 
City’s exercise of eminent domain to take their property for the purpose of economic redevelopment.  Id. 
at 472.  In a controversial decision, the Court held that a “public purpose”—in this instance economic 
redevelopment—was a public use that could support the exercise of eminent domain.  Id. at 489–90.  What 
is more, the Court recognized that “many States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter 
than the federal baseline.  Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state 
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the 
grounds upon which takings may be exercised.”  Id. 
 104.  See supra note 1.  A state’s police power is the inherent right of the sovereign to legislate to 
enhance the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.  Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 105.  The United States Supreme Court sketched out the framework for these hard cases in 1922: “The 
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking.”  Penn. Coal. Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922) (“We are in 
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.  As we already 
have said this is a question of degree—and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”).  
Since then, the Court has endeavored to determine exactly how far is “too far.”  See Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“[W]hether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid 
by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely upon the 
particular circumstances [in that] case.”) (internal quotation omitted).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, bright line 
rules in this area of the law—so-called “regulatory takings”—have been hard to come by.  See San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646–47 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The 
question presented on the merits in this case is whether a government entity must pay just compensation 
when a police power regulation has effected a ‘taking’ of ‘private property’ for ‘public use’ within the 
meaning of that constitutional provision.  Implicit in this question is the corollary issue whether a 
government entity’s exercise of its regulatory police power can ever effect a ‘taking’ within the meaning 
of the Just Compensation Clause.”).  Still, two bright-line rules are that “permanent physical invasions” 
and regulations stripping land of all economically beneficial use constitute takings.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007, 1015–17 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 421–22, 425–26 (1982). 
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to hold or use it and thereby seriously impairs its value.”106  The 1982 case of Seven 
Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission expanded on that 
definition, explaining that “[t]he proper procedure for analyzing taking questions is 
to determine the value of the property at the time of the governmental restriction and 
compare that with its value afterwards, to determine whether the diminution, if any, 
is so substantial as to strip the property of all practical value”107 
Applying these rules, the court was unwilling to find takings for the following: 
(1) lost profits due to public competition with a private ambulance service;108 (2) 
withholding “pass-through” of child support overpayments;109 (3) withholding 
overpayments of Medicare reimbursements;110 and (4) a wetlands ordinance that 
prevented building on property that was already unbuildable.111 
On the other hand, the court found that a taking occurred when a statute 
purported to allow a private way to be laid out across private property that was 
formerly a public way because it would not have been for a public use.112  A taking 
also occurred when a statute purported to expand the public’s existing rights to use 
private intertidal land because it deprived owners of an essential attribute of property: 
the right to exclude.113 
                                                                                                     
 106.  265 A.2d 711, 715 (Me. 1970).  The statute at issue required permission from a State Wetlands 
Control Board prior to any alteration or use of wetlands.  Id. at 712–13.  The statute has since been 
repealed.  P.L. 1975, ch. 595, § 1.  Making an ad hoc inquiry into “facts peculiar to the case,” the court 
found that preventing the property owners from filling their land was “both an unreasonable exercise of 
police power and equivalent to taking within constitutional considerations.”  Johnson, 265 A.2d at 716–
17 (emphasis added). 
 107.  450 A.2d 475, 482 (Me. 1982) (emphasis added). 
 108.  Ace Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. City of Augusta, 337 A.2d 661 (1975).  In Ace Ambulance, the City 
of Augusta planned to operate a publicly funded ambulance service as authorized by 30 M.R.S.A.  
§ 5105(7) (repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 737, § A, 1).  The plaintiffs operated a private ambulance service 
and argued that because they expected to lose profits due to competition, the City’s action amounted to a 
taking requiring just compensation.  The court did not agree, reasoning that “[n]or is the fact that in 
operation the act may tend to lessen the profits of a few private dealers or even force them from business, 
a matter of consideration for the court. ‘It is for the legislature to determine from time to time what laws 
and regulations are necessary or expedient for the defense and benefit of the people, and however 
inconvenienced, restricted or even damaged, particular persons and corporations may be, such general 
laws and regulations are held valid unless there can be pointed out, some provision in the State or United 
States Constitution, which clearly prohibits them.’”  Id. at 666–67 (citations omitted). 
 109.  Farley v. Dept. of Human Svcs., 621 A.2d 404 (1993).  The Law Court held that the “plaintiffs 
held no constitutionally protected property rights in the improperly withheld pass-through funds . . . .  ‘The 
concept of a taking does not apply to an overpayment of money to the state by a citizen, whether in the 
form of a welfare reimbursement[,] tax payment, or a fine under a statute later declared unconstitutional.’”  
Id. at 407 (“It would be quite strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to needy families 
. . . Congress or the States were deemed to have taken some of those very family members’ property.”). 
 110.  York Hosp. v. Me. Health Care Fin. Comm’n, 719 F.Supp. 1111, 1121 (D. Me. 1989) (“[T]he 
Court finds no entitlement on the part of Plaintiffs to ‘profits’ from its administration of care under the 
Medicare Act.  Absent legal entitlement to specific profits, there can be no property interest, and thus, no 
taking.”). 
 111.  MC Associates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2001 ME 89, ¶¶ 12–16, 773 A.2d 439 (holding that 
a landowner failed to establish that his property was actually “buildable” prior to the enactment of the 
wetlands ordinance that was being challenged and therefore did not establish that the ordinance deprived 
the landowner of economically viable use of the property). 
 112.  Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984). 
 113.  Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).  For a much more extensive discussion of this 
subject, see infra Part IV. 
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C. Summary 
While it lacks an enforceable right to do so, the public enjoys a liberal practice 
of using private land for recreation.  That practice stems from a long tradition of 
public access to private property, and Maine law provides incentives for landowners 
to allow such access.  Nonetheless, the existing scheme is weak in comparison to 
anything resembling a right to roam and reduces property to a one-sided 
consideration of the landowner’s perspective, allowing little or no weight to outside 
considerations.114  Compared with its neighbors, Maine’s hierarchy of rights is 
typical.  Even Vermont, which has constitutionalized a right to hunt on private 
property, allows for the abrogation of that right through a landowner’s affirmative 
actions.115 
Accordingly, Maine takings law demonstrates a consistent strong protection for 
individual property rights throughout the state’s history.  Thus, with limited 
exceptions for great ponds and the intertidal zone, Maine recognizes a right to 
exclude that trumps any public right to access private land, even if that right requires 
the landowner to take some affirmative action such as enclosing an area with a fence 
or posting no trespassing signs to exercise that right.116 
IV. CASE STUDY: PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE INTERTIDAL ZONE 
By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind—the air, running 
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.  No one, therefore, is 
forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, 
monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of 
nations.117 
An examination of Maine’s treatment of intertidal lands is especially 
informative on the issue of how the Law Court has addressed direct conflicts between 
public and private rights.  Disputes over intertidal land represent a perennially 
relevant clash between public and private rights and have spawned prolific litigation 
as well as extensive treatment in the literature. 
Most states hold title to intertidal land pursuant to the public trust doctrine.118  
That is to say, the public retains a right to access the intertidal zone regardless of the 
ownership of the upland parcels.119  Due to its shared legal heritage with 
Massachusetts, Maine has one of the most restrictive public trust doctrines in the 
                                                                                                     
 114.  FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 31 (“To phrase this arrangement . . . in terms of the legal right to 
exclude, is to view the issue from the landowner’s perspective.  It is to define the arrangement in terms of 
a legal right that sounds incomplete.  An alternative approach . . . is to assess things from the other side, 
in terms of rights possessed by the public to use otherwise private lands.”). 
 115.  See supra note 32. 
 116.  See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(C). 
 117.  JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th Am. ed. 1876). 
 118.  See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVT’L L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 119.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“It is the settled law of this country 
that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters . . . belong to the 
respective states within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion 
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public[.]”). 
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country.120  In the 1640’s, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, of which Maine was a part, 
passed a series of ordinances known as the “Body of Liberties.”121  The relevant 
portions are generally referred to today as the Colonial Ordinance of 1641–1647.122  
Among the provisions of the ordinance, fee owners of coastal land were 
presumptively given title, in fee simple, extending to the mean-low water mark.123  
This contrasts sharply with most other states and with most countries in the world.124  
Yet, the seemingly small difference between high and low water has been 
controversial and made a tremendous difference to the scope of public rights in the 
state. 
This case study of the public right to use the intertidal zone is helpful for two 
reasons.  First, the controversy involves highly valued oceanfront property.  The 
desirability of the contested property and the intensity of the controversy have 
generated a substantial body of case law on the issue.125  Second, the most recent 
cases in this area do not involve the establishment of novel rights to access the ocean 
where none previously existed.  Rather, the issue has been whether a pre-existing 
right could expand to encompass modern uses.  In ruling on that more limited issue, 
the Law Court’s holdings demonstrate that even a nominal infringement of the right 
to exclude constitutes a taking. 
A. Intertidal Lands before Moody Beach (Bell I/II) 
Cases beginning shortly after statehood and continuing through the mid-1980s 
trace Maine’s treatment of the common law in the intertidal zone.  In a case 
exemplifying the legal continuity between Massachusetts and the new State of 
Maine, Lapish v. President of Bangor Bank cites with approval a Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court opinion approving of the presumption that an upland 
owner’s property extends to the low-water mark.126  The court noted “[e]ver since 
[the decision in Storer v. Freeman], as well as long before, the law on this point has 
been considered as perfectly at rest; and we do not feel ourselves at liberty to discuss 
it as an open question.”127  Accordingly, the Law Court repeatedly reaffirmed and 
applied the presumption that the upland owner’s title extends to the low-water 
                                                                                                     
 120.  Craig, supra note 118, at 4–5. 
 121.  Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be Eroded With Time?, 57 ME. L. REV. 117, 
120 (2005). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 16, reprinted in Perry, supra note 79 (“[I]n all creeks, coves, 
and other places, about and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of the land 
adjoyning shall have propriete to the low water mark[.]”); see also Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude 
from Unimproved Land, TEMP. L. REV. 665, 671 (2011) (discussing Massachusetts’ and Maine’s failed 
attempts to overturn the 1647 statute that transferred ownership of the intertidal to the upland property 
owner). 
 124.  See generally Craig, supra note 118. 
 125.  See infra Part IV. 
 126.  8 Me. 85, 93 (1831). 
 127.  Id.  In Lapish, the Law Court cited with approval an opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, Storer v. Freeman.  Id.  Storer involved a dispute in what would become the state of Maine 
ten years later, in which the court held that the presumption of fee ownership to the low-water mark could 
be defeated by specific language in the deed.  Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 439–40 (1 Tyng) (1810). 
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mark.128  In this consistent line of cases, the court has held that private titles in Maine 
may include the intertidal zone, but that the public nevertheless retains some rights 
therein. 
B. Moody Beach and Aftermath 
In the 1980s, the Law Court issued a pair of opinions that drew a figurative “line 
in the sand” narrowly defining the rights held by the public in intertidal land.  The 
cases involved upland owners of Moody Beach, located in the Town of Wells, 
Maine.129  The owners sought to quiet title to their beachfront parcels, and to obtain 
declaratory judgment that the public claim to the intertidal zone encompassed only 
“fishing, fowling[,] and navigation.”130   
1. Bell v. Town of Wells 
In Bell I, the Law Court reviewed the general principles of the public trust 
doctrine related to intertidal zones in the United States—except for Maine and 
Massachusetts.131  However, the court explicitly noted that the common law of the 
intertidal zone in Maine is distinct from the common law of England, having 
developed instead from the Colonial Ordinance.132  The court went on to conclude 
that these considerations compelled the conclusion that upland owners of shorefront 
land also own title in fee simple to the adjoining intertidal zone, subject to a public 
easement for “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”133 
                                                                                                     
 128.  E.g., Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384, 392 (1847) (holding that the ordinance 
of 1641 did not intend to abridge the right to use the waters between high and low water for navigation, 
nor to remain on the flats for commercial purposes at the ebb of the tide); State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 
(1856) (holding that an upland owner’s “title to the shore [is] as ample as to the upland.”); Marshall v. 
Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 45 A. 497, 498 (1900) (“[T]he proprietor of the main holds the shore to low 
water . . . in fee, like other lands, subject, however, to the jus publicum, the right of the public to use it for 
the purposes of navigation and of fishery[.]”). 
 129.  Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986) [hereinafter Bell I]. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 511 (describing as “settled” that “[b]y the common law of England that was brought to this 
country by the earliest settlers, unless title to the intertidal zone was held by private landowners pursuant 
to grant or prescription or by the crown in its private capacity, the title was vested in the crown which 
held it in trust for the use of the public.”).  The idea that certain lands were held by the sovereign in trust 
for the public is of ancient pedigree and is referred to as the “public trust doctrine.”  Public-trust Doctrine, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th. ed. 2009).  
 132.  Bell I, 510 A.2d at 512 (distinguishing Maine and Massachusetts law from the rest of the United 
States because “the Maine common law of the intertidal zone has not developed directly from English 
common law, but from the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641–47.”). 
 133.  Id. at 514–15 (noting that a grantor can, by specific deed language, convey the uplands without 
the intertidal or the intertidal without the uplands.).  This holding is not without controversy.  Arguments 
have been made that the Colonial Ordinance was not a grant of title or, even if it was, it was beyond the 
state’s power to grant, and at most the presumption of ownership is of “qualified title.”  See Orlando E. 
Delogu, Friend of the Court: An Array of Arguments to Urge Reconsideration of the Moody Beach Cases 
and Expand Public Use Rights in the Intertidal Zone, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 57–69 (2010).  
Delogu further argues that the Law Court erred in failing to apply the equal footing doctrine, as interpreted 
in Shively v. Bowlby, whereby states newly admitted into the Union are intended to have the same rights 
as the other States.  Id. at 69–74; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).  However, questioning the Bell I 
holding is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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Three years later, the court returned to the Moody Beach issues in Bell II to 
determine whether the public easement was limited to those purposes the court found 
in Bell I: fishing, fowling, and navigation.134  In a four-to-three decision, the Law 
Court held that the public easement encompassed only those previously enumerated 
purposes.135  With the status of the intertidal zone settled in respect to fee title and 
the extent of the public easement, the court went on to consider Maine’s Public Trust 
in Intertidal Land Act.136 
The Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act (the “Act”) was passed by the Maine 
Legislature as an attempt to “protect public uses” in the intertidal zone—something 
“of great public interest and grave concern to the State.”137  The Act codified the 
existing common law of the intertidal zone but also expanded the public rights, 
declaring that they included “[t]he right to use intertidal land for recreation[.]”138  
The court held that the Act was an unconstitutional taking of private property without 
paying just compensation.139  The court did not analyze the statute as a regulatory 
taking,140 but rather as an infringement on the landowner’s right to exclude, 
constituting a physical invasion that destroyed an “essential attribute” of private 
property.141  The court endorsed the view that “[i]f a possessory interest in real 
property has any meaning at all it must include the general right to exclude others.”142  
Following Bell II, the court has had several opportunities to apply its holding in other 
similar cases over the years. 
2. Eaton v. Town of Wells 
In 2000, the Law Court decided Eaton v. Town of Wells, a case with facts similar 
to those in Bell.143  The Eatons sued the Town of Wells seeking to quiet title to their 
portion of Wells Beach, which was the site of longstanding public recreational use.144  
The Town asserted an easement by prescription and the State intervened, asserting a 
claim that the public trust doctrine encompassed “walking and other recreational and 
amusement activities, in addition to fishing, fowling, and navigation.”145  The court 
held that the Town had in fact established a public easement by prescription over the 
Eatons’ portion of Wells Beach, but, in so doing, the court avoided reaching the issue 
                                                                                                     
 134.  Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter Bell II]. 
 135.  Id. at 173. 
 136.  Id. at 176–79. 
 137.  12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571–573 (2005 & Supp. 2014) (declared unconstitutional by Bell II, 557 A.2d at 
179). 
 138.  Id. § 573(1)(B). 
 139.  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 176–79. 
 140.  See cases cited supra notes 106–107. 
 141.  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177–78; Johnson, 265 A.2d at 715.  The court relied on the Kaiser-Loretto-
Nollan line of Supreme Court cases discussed supra in Part II.B.  See supra notes 35, 39–40. 
 142.  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 178 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 689, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 
(1974). 
 143.  2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 232.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, for a critique of 
the court’s Eaton opinion, see Orlando E. Delogu, Eaton v. Town of Wells: A Critical Comment, 6 OCEAN 
& COASTAL L.J. 225 (2001).  
 144.  Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶¶ 8–9, 760 A.2d 232. 
 145.  Id. ¶ 3. 
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of the public trust doctrine.146 
3. McGarvey v. Whittredge 
The 2011 case of McGarvey v. Whittredge provided a factual variation on a 
similar question.147  The case involved a pair of scuba divers in an unusual situation 
in that they were unable to access the ocean from their own property, but were able 
to access the ocean by crossing only the neighbor’s intertidal land, without passing 
through the neighbor’s uplands.148  McGarvey sought declaratory judgment that 
Whittredge had no right to cross the intertidal zone for scuba diving and an injunction 
preventing that use.149 
In a split opinion, three judges voted effectively to abandon Bell II’s rigid 
adherence to fishing, fowling, and navigation as the only permissible public activities 
in the intertidal zone, preferring instead to read those terms as providing context 
rather than exclusively defining the public trust rights.150  Another three judges voted 
to retain the strict limitation, but to read the right to navigation with a “sympathetic 
generosity” broad enough to encompass crossing the intertidal zone to enter the 
ocean for scuba diving.151 
While the Law Court’s opinion was significant for expressly allowing a new 
type of activity, the crack it opened was a narrow one.  It also raised the question 
whether it is workable for the court to be called on to determine, on a per-activity 
basis, whether the public has the associated right to engage in that activity in the 
intertidal zone.  Despite another opportunity to do so, the court once again avoided 
revisiting its Bell II holding.152 
C. Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport 
Adding to this twenty-five year history of the public trust doctrine in the 
intertidal zone, the Law Court recently decided several issues in the most recent of 
the “beach cases:” Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport.153  The controversy in 
Almeder concerned the public right to use Goose Rocks Beach in Kennebunkport.154  
Goose Rocks Beach is a long sandy beach with ownership of the uplands fragmented 
                                                                                                     
 146.  Id. ¶ 49.  However, a concurring opinion would have preferred to overrule the court’s holding in 
Bell II.  Id. ¶ 50 (Saufley, J. concurring). 
 147.  2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620.  For a critical analysis of the court’s holding, see Benjamin Donahue, 
Case Note, McGarvey v. Whittredge: Continued Uncertainty in Maine’s Intertidal Zone, 64 ME. L. REV. 
593 (2012). 
 148.  McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 2–4, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 149.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 150.  Id. ¶ 56. 
 151.  Id. ¶ 77 (Levy, J., concurring). 
 152.  Chief Justice Saufley continued to argue that the court need not “strictly adhere to principles of 
stare decisis when addressing the development of the common law,” and that Bell II should not be 
construed to limit, forever, the public’s rights in the intertidal zone.  Id. ¶¶ 52–56 (Saufley, C.J., 
concurring); see also Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶¶ 50–55, 760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring). 
 153.  Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 139, 106 A.3d 1099.  This opinion amends and 
supersedes the Law Court’s initial opinion in the case, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 12, 
2014 WL 418052.  Subsequently, the court heard motions to reconsider the judgment, which it denied in 
part and granted in part.  Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 106 A.3d 1115 (Me. 2014). 
 154.  Almeder, 214 ME 139, ¶ 1, 106 A.3d 1099. 
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into numerous private house lots mixed with publicly owned parcels and access 
points.155  For many years, beachfront owners, backlot owners, and the public alike 
have used and enjoyed horizontal access to the beach.156  During the twentieth 
century, the town patrolled and maintained the beach and even provided lifeguards 
for a time.157  Still, the duration and nature of the public’s use goes back 400 years 
with the beach serving as, among other things, a public highway, animal pasture, and 
source for gathering seaweed.158  The public’s use of the beach has been 
uninterrupted for that period, but the nature of those uses has changed over time.159 
In 2009, the beachfront owners sued the Town of Kennebunkport, seeking (1) 
declaratory judgment that the public rights in the intertidal were limited to those 
usages expressly permitted by the Colonial Ordinance, and (2) to quiet title to their 
parcels down to the mean low-water mark.160  The York County Superior Court 
found not only that the public had acquired a prescriptive easement to use the beach, 
and that the public had obtained an easement by custom to use the beach, but that the 
public trust doctrine, as expressed by the Colonial Ordinance, permits the public to 
engage in ocean-based activities such as windsurfing and paddle boarding.161  On 
appeal, the issues of primary importance for this Comment were whether the trial 
court erred: (1) in granting a prescriptive easement to the Town; (2) in granting a 
public easement by custom; and (3) in holding that the public trust doctrine includes 
the right to engage in ocean-based activities. 
Establishing an easement based on prescription is similar to establishing a claim 
to title through adverse possession.162  Specifically, a claim of a prescriptive 
easement must be based on a use: (1) under a claim of right adverse to the owner; (2) 
with the owner’s knowledge or acquiescence; and (3) for the statutory period of at 
least twenty years.163  Establishing an easement by custom is somewhat different, 
having “developed in English common law to account for usage that lasted from time 
immemorial, without interruption and as a right, and that was reasonable, certain, 
peaceably enjoyed and consistent with other customs and laws.”164  
                                                                                                     
 155.  Brief for Appellee Town of Kennebunkport at 12, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 
ME 12, 106 A.3d 1099.  Of Maine’s 3,500 miles of shoreline, approximately 2% is considered “beach” 
and only half of that—35 miles—is sand.  Costal Marine Geology—Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T 
OF AGRIC, CONSERVATION, AND FORESTRY, http://www.maine.gov/dacf/mgs/explore/marine/ 
faq.html#q15 (last visited December 6, 2014).  Sand is therefore a rare commodity of great significance 
to beach-goers in Maine. 
 156.  Almeder, 2014 ME 139, ¶¶ 6–11, 106 A.3d 1099.  On a typical Maine beachfront, an access road 
runs parallel to the beach with house lots on either side of the road.  The so-called “backlot” owners are 
those whose parcels are across the road from the beachfront.  See Back Lands, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 157.  Brief for Appellee Town of Kennebunkport at 7, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 
12, 106 A.3d 1099. 
 158.  Id. at 3–4. 
 159.  Id. at 3–15. 
 160.  Almeder, 2014 ME 139, ¶ 3, 106 A.3d 1099. 
 161.  Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, YORSC-RE-2009-111 at 21 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cnty., 
Oct. 16, 2012). 
 162.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 (describing the elements of 
establishing an easement by prescription). 
 163.  Almeder, 2014 ME 139, ¶¶ 20–22, 106 A.3d 1099. 
 164.  Id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The significance of this holding is discussed infra, but what the court did not 
decide is equally important.  The court reasoned that because the issue in front of it 
was solely whether the history of use established a public easement by prescription, 
the lower court’s holding that the public trust doctrine was broad enough to 
encompass ocean-based recreational uses was premature, and it vacated that court’s 
interpretation of the public trust doctrine.165  On the remaining issues, the court held 
that the Town had also failed to establish an easement by custom.166  Here the court 
was persuaded that easement by custom is “largely a dead doctrine in the United 
States because . . . no American custom could have lasted long enough to be 
immemorial, and that we have established methods for claiming and recording rights 
in land that no longer necessitate employment of the doctrine.”167  Accordingly, the 
Law Court “[has] never recognized an easement by custom as a viable cause of action 
in Maine.”168 
Finally, the court remanded to the trial court the determination of whether the 
Town had established a prescriptive easement allowing the public to access the 
beach.169  During the trial, the Town strenuously argued that the court should make 
the determination of a prescriptive easement as to the entire beach.170  However, the 
Law Court remanded the case so that the determination could be made on a parcel-
by-parcel basis.171  Recognizing that allowing a party to relitigate an issue it had 
expressly waived was unusual, the court noted that due to the importance of “public[] 
access to sandy beaches in Maine,” equity demanded that the issue be reopened.172  
However, in strong terms the court instructed the trial court to apply the presumption 
of permission to the facts of the case.173 
D. Summary 
The court’s position firmly precludes any gain of public rights in the intertidal 
zone through either legislation or prescription.  Since Bell II, the Law Court has 
avoided revisiting its decision despite numerous invitations to do so.  While this line 
of cases remains controversial, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to criticize 
                                                                                                     
 165.  Id. ¶ 36.  The court reiterated that the public trust doctrine remains defined as it was in Bell II.  
Id. ¶ 35 n.22. 
 166.  Id. ¶ 35, 106 A.3d 1099. 
 167.  Id. (quoting 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.11[6], at 34–132 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168.  Id.  Nor does there appear to be any party inclined to argue that Maine should follow a doctrine 
allowing the establishment of easement by custom.  For example, the Maine Snowmobile Association 
opposes such a doctrine, believing that it would result in a “chilling effect on landowners’ willingness to 
allow recreational access to their land.”  Brief of the Maine Snowmobile Association as Amicus Curiae 
at 12, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 139, 106 A.3d 1099; see supra Part III.A. 
 169.  Almeder, 2014 ME 139, ¶ 33, 106 A.3d 1099. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 173.  Id. ¶ 33 (“[T]his is precisely the type of matter in which Lyons requires that the presumption of 
permission be applied.  On remand, when the court evaluates the element of adversity, it must consider 
whether the Town has rebutted the presumption.”); see supra Part III.B.3. 
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the legal correctness of those decisions.174  Rather, the precedential effect of these 
cases—particularly Bell II’s holding that the right to exclude is an essential attribute 
of property ownership—is considered for what it says about the meaning of private 
property and the scope of the right to exclude in Maine. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. What is Left for the Public? 
In light of the Law Court’s holdings in Bell I, Bell II, Eaton, McGarvey, and 
Almeder (collectively, “beach cases”), and the Supreme Court’s holdings in Kaiser, 
Loretto, and Nollan, the first question is whether anything of a public right to roam 
remains, or whether it has been completely consumed by a private right to exclude.175 
1. Token Public Rights to Use Private Land 
A person in Maine assessing the degree to which he can access the outdoors 
finds that his positive rights to access the land of others are few.176  Nearly 400 years 
later, the only reliable protections are the common law rights derived from the 
Colonial Ordinance—the right to ingress and egress relative to a great pond, and the 
right to fish, fowl, and navigate in the intertidal.177  Despite the solidity of those two 
rights and their common law pedigree, the Law Court has ironically left little room 
for common law development in this area. 
In place of a right to roam, a would-be outdoorsman in Maine has the benefit of 
the presumption of landowner consent to public access.178  This presumption results 
from a long history and tradition of landowner acquiescence to public use of 
unimproved land and is surely quite valuable.179  However, the fact that such use is 
always subject to the landowner’s withdrawal of consent means that there is no 
guarantee that this arrangement is stable or sufficient to protect the broad access to 
private land that the public currently enjoys.  Recreational users should therefore 
question whether there is any possibility of expanding public rights to use private 
land. 
2. Restoring the Right to Roam 
Conceptually, there are only a few ways for the public to obtain new or expanded 
rights to access private land: (1) legislative action; (2) easement, by prescription or 
                                                                                                     
 174.  However, there are substantial arguments that Bell II was wrongly decided and should be 
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custom; (3) purchase, by voluntary sale or eminent domain; and (4) other private 
agreement.  Whatever the ultimate fate of Bell II, the Law Court was clear in that 
case that the public cannot acquire a right to use private property by legislation that 
infringes on a landowner’s right to exclude as the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands 
Act purported to do.180  The logical extension of the Bell holdings and their progeny 
is that the Law Court would view any legislative attempt to create a public right to 
access private land as a categorical taking because it would diminish a landowner’s 
right to exclude others.181  Yet, the court’s insistence on an absolute right to exclude 
is inconsistent with history.182  As was discussed supra, the absolute right to exclude 
was not originally part of a landowner’s bundle of sticks in the United States.183  
Nevertheless, under the current state of the law, any legislative restoration of the 
right to roam is a non-starter.184  The court favors a private property regime that in 
many ways reveres at its center the notion of private property as an absolute 
individual entitlement.  Still, it is unsatisfying if all the Legislature may do is increase 
the number of benefits accruing to landowners in exchange for their suffering public 
access.185 
As for establishing public prescriptive easements, Eaton seemed to open the 
door.186  With parties aligned in the same fashion as in the case of Almeder, the Eaton 
court held that the Town had established a public easement by prescription.187  
However, this opening was short-lived and the court’s holding in Almeder weakens 
that option.188  In a footnote, discussing the presumption that recreational activities 
are undertaken with the permission of the landowner, the court factually 
distinguished Eaton and reiterated that the presumption of permission must be 
applied in such circumstances.189 
Whether or not the court correctly applied the presumption of permission in 
Eaton, its opinion in Lyons v. Baptist School of Christian Training was clear that the 
presumption applies whenever the public makes recreational use of private 
property.190  The Law Court held in Lyons that “it is the public recreational uses of 
land, not the nature of the land alone, that triggers application of the rebuttable 
                                                                                                     
 180.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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presumption of permissive use in public prescriptive easement cases,” and that it 
applies equally to “children playing on a vacant lot in town, hunters and 
snowmobilers crossing a cultivated field after the harvest, or families camping on 
privately owned wood lots.”191  Thus, Almeder limits, or at least reaffirms the 
limitation on, the public’s ability to acquire rights through an easement by 
prescription or custom.192 
Although purchase of the intertidal zone is another alternative, the cost for 
municipalities is probably prohibitive.193  A more aggressive option would be to 
accept that granting public rights in the intertidal is a taking, exercise eminent 
domain for that purpose, but argue that just compensation under the circumstances 
is no more than a nominal payment.194  Still, political concerns likely foreclose that 
option.  Currently, that leaves only the fourth conceptual option—private 
agreement—to obtain and protect a public right to access private property. 
3. Begging Permission to Roam 
In theory, a balance between the landowner’s legitimate concerns regarding 
access and the public’s understandable interest in gaining access should work well.  
There is an ever-present risk that abusive behavior on behalf of recreational users 
will result in a loss of access because property owners would respond by withdrawing 
consent for public use.195  At the same time, the presumption of permission and the 
abrogation of a legal duty to recreational users—defeating adverse possession and 
prescription claims as well as tort claims—mean that landowners have little practical 
need to deny access until and unless their land is abused.196 
The examples of the Maine Snowmobile Association and the Maine Island Trail 
Association prove that this arrangement works in practice.  The combination of a 
tradition of shared access along with the associated landowner protections has 
created a legal environment that permits, if not outright fosters, the development of 
broad swathes of private land to which the public enjoys nearly free access.197  
Although the transaction costs are high, these sorts of negotiated arrangements 
successfully strike a balance between a landowner’s interest in a right to exclude and 
the public interest in having recreational access to private land.198 
There may also be an additional benefit in that this sort of arrangement could 
mitigate the “tragedy of the commons” that may result if the public had an unlimited 
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 194.  It is beyond the scope of this Comment to speculate, but it seems that a reasonable argument 
could be made that just compensation for the landowner’s nominally diminished right to exclude would 
itself be nominal.  
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right to access private land.199  Significantly, one of the important concerns to the 
Bell plaintiffs was that the beach had both a privately owned and a publicly owned 
section.200  Although the town enforced a set of rules on the public portion, there was 
no such enforcement on the private beach.201  As a result, people engaged in the most 
objectionable activities simply took their use across to the private side of the beach 
where there was no enforcement.202 
Both the Maine Snowmobile Association and the Maine Island Trail Association 
seek and obtain affirmative landowner permission in exchange for a promise of 
responsible use and good stewardship.203  In some sense, these communities have 
organized around supporting the absolute conception of private property rights, but 
taken a pragmatic approach to obtaining the best result.  By securing the investment 
of both the community of landowners and the community of users, these 
organizations seek to protect public access and avoid the degradation of the 
resource.204 
4. Summary 
Maine’s people, through their Legislature, have placed a high value on public 
access to natural resources.205  Yet, Maine’s highest court, through its opinions in the 
beach cases, has interpreted Maine’s Constitution to impose a nearly complete 
restriction on the degree to which Maine’s people may gain access, by right, to use 
more than 90% of Maine’s land area.206  Nevertheless, the system of legal incentives 
and protections that landowners enjoy likely fosters greater landowner willingness 
to allow public use of private land than might otherwise exist, and serves to 
perpetuate Maine’s longstanding tradition of presumed permission.207  This legal 
regime contributes to the creation of groups dedicated to securing explicit permission 
to use private land in a quasi-public manner and offering user-stewardship of these 
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recreational resources in return.208   
The question remains whether the current state of the law is the most the public 
can hope for.  While the current regime fosters a culture of permissive use that 
addresses the Legislature’s policy of ensuring public access to the outdoors, it still 
depends on landowner acquiescence to a social contract that may be unstable.  The 
primary tool of the Legislature has been to offer a series of incentives to landowners.  
The next section of this Comment considers a fundamental change to one of 
property’s articles of faith. 
B. Unringing Bell 
It is not an easy task to unring a bell, nor to remove from the mind  
an impression once firmly imprinted there.209 
Ever since the Bell cases, the Law Court’s holding has been controversial, and 
many have argued that the court’s holding was legally incorrect or that there is 
support for interpreting the list of permitted uses as examples rather than excluding 
all other possible uses.210  The Law Court itself is divided on the continued vitality 
of Bell in the context of the intertidal.211 
Supposing that the Law Court one day accepts an invitation to overrule its 
holding in Bell, it would create an opening for an increased public right to use certain 
private land in Maine.  Yet, the opening would be only in the use of the intertidal 
itself.  The court did not limit itself in Bell II to holding that the Tidal Lands Act 
violated the Maine Constitution, but the federal Constitution as well.212  Specifically, 
the court held that the Tidal Lands Act took greater rights than those reserved by the 
common law, violating the Takings Clause.213  Even if the court later decides that 
the common law permits certain activities, or even broad recreational rights, in the 
intertidal, it would not follow that the public could gain similar rights in a terrestrial 
setting.  Under the Kaiser-Loretto-Nollan line of cases, the Supreme Court would 
view an attempt to create such public rights as a taking.214 
C. Moderating the Right to Exclude 
This raises the question whether the Court’s formalism regarding a right to 
exclude is justified.  The Supreme Court has constructed a formidable barrier to 
granting the public anything resembling a right to roam across private land.215  
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Despite characterizing the right to exclude as “one of the most essential,” it was not 
always the case, nor is there any reason compelling that conclusion as necessary.216  
Finding an absolute right to exclude in connection with real property severely curtails 
the instrumental functions of property.  As in Locke’s creation myth, the Court has 
placed society’s role subservient to individual property rights instead of the reverse 
or a thoughtful balance.217 
Locke himself understood the limitations of his labor theory.218  Specifically, he 
acknowledged that the labor theory only worked when land was abundant.219  The 
degree to which United States courts have adhered to an absolute right to exclude 
denies the reality that the planet does not contain “enough, and as good, left in 
common for others.”220  Thomas Paine, by comparison, described a conception of 
private property that differed from Locke’s in one fundamental respect.221  Whereas 
under Locke’s theory a man obtains ownership of land to which he has applied his 
labor, Paine thought, “[I]t is the value of the improvement only, and not the earth 
itself, that is individual property.”222 
Paine’s differentiation between the right to own the earth itself and the right to 
own improvements provides a solid theoretical underpinning for a more just 
conception of the right to exclude.  The proper scope of the right to exclude would 
extend only to improved land while the landowner would retain the sole right to make 
improvements.223  Put another way, private use would remain superior to public use, 
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but public use would in turn become superior to private non-use. 
As the examples from Sweden and England show, the right to exclude need not 
be absolute to protect a landowner’s important interests.224  Moreover, examples 
from the United States’ own history show that a more limited right to exclude is not 
fundamentally anathema to American notions of liberty, freedom, and property.225  
Tempering that right so that it applied only to the landowner’s homestead, land under 
cultivation, or other improved land would have the effect of restoring a public right 
to access the countryside while harming nothing other than an absolutist ideology. 
Instead, the right to exclude currently functions as a property right for 
landowners to enjoy the status quo.226  Lost is the recognition that property rights in 
a finite world cannot consider solely the relationship between an individual and his 
property, but must also consider the relationship between the individual, other 
individuals with property, and those without.227  Without this recognition, courts 
weighing disputes between landowners and non-landowners will risk being 
unbalanced and unjust. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Maine citizens and visitors to the state are fortunate to have an enviable degree 
of access to some of the most beautiful and captivating landscapes in the country: 
the rocky and sandy coast, sprawling fields and meadows, peaceful lakes, and the 
seemingly endless north woods.  This access is all the more remarkable because so 
much of it takes place on private land.  Yet, private landowners have steadily 
accumulated rights adverse to the public interest over the past few centuries, 
culminating in an explicit, fundamental, and, according to the Supreme Court, 
absolute right to exclude others. 
However, the expansion of a private landowner’s right to exclude has come at 
the cost of the public right to roam.  The fact that courts have focused only on the 
individual landowner’s perspective—viewing an increase in his power to exclude as 
an expansion of absolute liberty—obscures half of what logic dictates must be a zero-
sum equation.  Since man first looked to the Moon and saw the round shadow of our 
Earth fall across it, courts have had no excuse for failing to behave in accordance 
with a world where all resources—especially land—are finite.  Rights then, 
particularly rights in land, cannot be created from thin air but must instead be granted 
by the public to an individual.  Truly, the unfettered right to exclude has deprived 
every other person of essential property rights—for which there has been no 
compensation. 
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